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OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Plaintiff Schering-Plough, Inc.
1
 brings this action 
against the United States for recovery of nearly $500 million 
in taxes it claims the IRS incorrectly assessed against it.  It 
argues, first, that the funds it received as a result of two 
transactions were not, as the IRS contends, immediately 
taxable in full as proceeds of loans from foreign subsidiaries; 
and, second, that it suffered disparate treatment in comparison 
with another taxpayer who engaged in similar transactions but 
was not assessed taxes on the proceeds in the same way.  The 
United States prevailed on both claims in the District Court, 
and Schering-Plough timely appealed.  For the reasons given 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s decision on both 
claims.
2
 
I. 
 
                                              
1
 During the course of this action, Schering-Plough purchased 
Merck, Inc., and the combined entity is now known as Merck.  
For the sake of consistency with the prior opinions in this 
case, we shall continue to refer to plaintiff as Schering-
Plough. 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 4 
 
A. Background 
In the early 1990s, Schering-Plough, a New Jersey 
pharmaceuticals company, was the ultimate owner of two 
Swiss subsidiaries, Scherico and Limited.  These subsidiaries 
conducted significant manufacturing operations in Ireland, 
which, at the time, had a favorable corporate income tax.  
Each of the subsidiaries held significant cash reserves.  
Scherico had a modest amount of earnings not yet taxed in the 
United States, whereas Limited had earnings of nearly $1 
billion untaxed in the United States.   
 
Schering-Plough wished to make use of those cash 
reserves to engage in certain business activities, such as a 
stock repurchase program.  However, Subpart F of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-965, which governs 
the taxation of the income of U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries, 
dictates that, while such income is not taxable in the United 
States when earned, it is subject to taxation if it is ever 
invested in “United States property.”  Such property is 
defined to include any debt obligation of U.S. companies.  In 
other words, if a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company lends 
or distributes money to its parent, the U.S. company is 
required to recognize that money as income.
3
  Thus, 
Schering-Plough’s subsidiaries, Scherico and Limited, could 
not simply make a loan or pay dividends to Schering-Plough 
                                              
3
 This is in contrast to the ordinary treatment of loans, which 
are usually not treated as income for tax purposes.  A U.S. 
company therefore has an incentive to characterize any funds 
received from a foreign subsidiary as the proceeds of a sale, 
rather than a loan. 
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without the proceeds being subject to taxation in full that 
year.   
 
To avoid immediate taxation under Subpart F of the 
entire sum it wished to repatriate, Schering-Plough consulted 
Merrill Lynch, an investment bank that had devised other tax-
management strategies for Schering-Plough.  Merrill Lynch 
proposed to Schering-Plough a scheme involving interest rate 
swaps.  Under the scheme, Scherico would provide the funds 
desired to Schering-Plough.  In return, Schering-Plough 
would transfer to Scherico one of Schering-Plough’s accounts 
receivable.  To create the receivable for transfer to Scherico, 
Schering-Plough negotiated an interest rate swap with an 
accommodating party—Algemene Bank Nederland (“ABN”), 
a Dutch financial institution.  Schering-Plough then assigned 
its receivable payment stream resulting from this swap to 
Scherico.   
 
An interest rate swap is a common and legitimate 
corporate transaction.
4
  We draw background information 
concerning the nature of a swap from the District Court’s 
extensively researched findings.  “The counterparties [i.e., 
Schering-Plough and ABN] agreed to make interest payments 
to each other based on a notional amount of principal, and 
[for each] to make payments under a different interest rate for 
a set term of years.  The parties only exchanged the interest 
payments, not the notional principal [which was used only as 
the basis of calculating the payments due]. . . . The 
standardized swap terms permitted ABN and Schering-
                                              
4
 Swaps are often used, for instance, to hedge away the risk 
that an interest rate that a company is exposed to will 
fluctuate in an unfavorable way. 
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Plough to offset (net) the two payments, such that the party 
owing the higher amount paid only the difference.”   
Schering-Plough Corp. v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 219, 
229 (D.N.J. 2009).   
 
From the point of view of either party, the swap 
consisted both of a “pay leg” (the responsibility to pay the 
other according to the first interest rate designated in the 
contract) and a “receive leg” (the right to receive payments 
from the other based on the other interest rate designated in 
the contract).  This swap agreement permitted the assignment 
of the receive leg to a third party.  “Significantly, upon any 
assignment, the parties could no longer net payments; rather, 
each periodic payment would be due in full to the party 
owning the right to the particular income stream . . . . In other 
words, upon assignment of its receive leg rights, Schering-
Plough remained duty-bound to make the entire periodic pay 
leg distributions to ABN,” regardless of whether ABN 
fulfilled its “parallel obligation to make the payments to 
Schering-Plough’s third-party designee.”  Id.  The same 
applied to ABN; it would have to make its payments to 
Schering-Plough’s assignee regardless of whether Schering-
Plough was making payments to it.  
 
At the time Merrill Lynch made its proposal to 
Schering-Plough, the sale of notional principal contracts such 
as interest rate swaps was governed by IRS Notice 89-21, 
which provided that, when a party sells one “leg” of a swap, 
so that it receives a lump sum in exchange for the right to 
receive revenues over the remaining life of the swap, that sum 
should not be recognized as income all at once, but rather 
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should be accounted for over the whole life of the swap.
5
  
Notice 89-21 specifically stated that “[n]o inference should be 
drawn from this notice as to the proper treatment of 
transactions that are not properly characterized as notional 
principal contracts, for instance, to the extent that such 
transactions are in substance properly characterized as 
loans.” (emphasis added)  This notice has since been 
repealed, and parties are now required to recognize all such 
payments as loans.  26 C.F.R. §§ 1.446-3(g)(4), h(4)(1). 
 
In accordance with the scheme designed by Merrill 
Lynch, Schering-Plough entered into a 20-year interest rate 
swap (with payments at six-month intervals) with a bank, 
ABN.  This swap agreement included a “credit trigger” which 
allowed ABN to terminate it if Schering-Plough’s credit 
rating was downgraded for more than 60 days.  ABN, 
meanwhile, entered into a “mirror” swap with Merrill Lynch 
that was essentially designed to perfectly offset the swap with 
Schering-Plough, as well as compensating ABN for its 
involvement.  That is, to whatever extent ABN might be the 
loser in the swap with Schering-Plough, it would be the 
gainer in the swap with Merrill Lynch.
6
         
                                              
5
 In general, parties wish to delay recognition of income for 
income tax purposes for as long as possible, as this gives 
them “free use,” at least in the short term, of the money that 
would otherwise be paid as taxes.  Therefore, Notice 89-21 
dictated a generally favorable tax treatment of such sales. 
6
 Essentially, in the “mirror” swap, Merrill Lynch paid ABN a 
sum calculated with respect to the same interest rate that 
ABN was already using to calculate its obligation to 
Schering-Plough, while ABN paid Merrill Lynch a sum 
calculated with respect to the same interest rate that Schering-
 8 
 
 
Schering-Plough then assigned the “receive leg” of the 
swap to Scherico for a lump sum, as was explicitly permitted 
under the terms of the initial swap.
7
  Scherico also received a 
                                                                                                     
Plough was using to determine what it owed ABN.  The 
Schering-Plough-ABN and ABN-Merrill Lynch swaps were 
thus designed to cancel each other out, so that (except for a 
fee for its participation) the economic effect on ABN would 
be neutral.  (Schering-Plough also paid Merrill Lynch several 
million dollars for its role in engineering these transactions.) 
7
 Actually, Schering-Plough first sold the first five years of 
the “receive leg” to an unrelated party, Banco di Roma, 
ostensibly to establish its market value.  Thus, only fifteen 
years of the “receive leg” were sold to Scherico.  
 
Interestingly, the funds for Banco di Roma to purchase the 
“receive leg” from Schering-Plough were provided as a zero-
coupon certificate of deposit by ABN.  ABN had the right to 
purchase the receive leg from Banco di Roma, and Banco di 
Roma had the right to sell the receive leg to ABN. Rather 
than paying periodic interest to ABN, Banco di Roma was 
compensated for each year that it continued to hold the 
receive leg.  ABN ultimately purchased the receive leg from 
Banco di Roma in March 1993, thereby ending its obligation 
to pay Banco di Roma (as it now held the right to receive 
funds from itself).  Although the District Court did not need 
to consider the question, it certainly appears as if 
“independent third party” Banco di Roma were being 
compensated to enter into a “sale,” with financing provided 
entirely by ABN, structured to establish the desired “market 
value” for the remaining years of the swap contract (i.e., the 
amount that Schering-Plough wished to repatriate).  Once a 
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“put option” which gave it the right to sell the “receive leg” 
back to Schering-Plough for its current market value at any 
time.
8
  Most of the funds paid over to Schering-Plough, 
however, were actually channeled from Limited through 
Scherico (as Limited held most of the untaxed earnings).
9
  We 
will refer to the scheme as a whole as the (first) Transaction.   
 
Thus, initially, Schering-Plough and ABN had 
reciprocal obligations to each other alone, to pay each other at 
intervals according to the interest rates defined in each swap 
agreement.  In practice, this meant that the party who was the 
net loser on the swap would pay the net gainer the difference.  
But by splitting the normally paired “pay leg” and “receive 
leg” of the swap, the parties created a triangular relationship 
among Schering-Plough, ABN, and Scherico.  Schering-
Plough was obligated to pay ABN at intervals based on a 
particular interest rate (as defined in the original swap).  
ABN, meanwhile, was obligated to pay Scherico based on 
another interest rate (because Scherico had been assigned the 
“receive leg” of the swap from Schering-Plough).  Schering-
Plough had received a lump sum of money from Scherico in 
                                                                                                     
seemly period of time had passed, ABN effectively nullified 
the sale, leaving Banco di Roma with a little something in its 
pocket for its trouble.  
8
 Ultimately, the “receive leg” of the first Transaction was 
repurchased in this fashion, and the swaps were terminated in 
2004.  It appears that the second Transaction (described 
below) lacked this explicit put option. 
9
 Schering-Plough has stipulated that, if the transactions are 
characterized as loans, the lender should be deemed to be 
Limited, not Scherico. 
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exchange for the “receive leg” of the swap.  The parties then 
repeated this transaction (the second Transaction) the 
following year, but with another Swiss subsidiary of 
Schering-Plough, Essex Chemie, A.G., replacing Scherico. 
 
This scheme was intended to allow Schering-Plough to 
report the lump sum it received as income over the life of the 
swap under Notice 89-21, rather than all at once, as it would 
have had to under Subpart F if it simply took a loan or 
dividends from Scherico.  That is, instead of accounting for it 
immediately as an investment in “United States property,” 
Schering-Plough accounted for it as a sale of a leg of a swap, 
which under Notice 89-21 meant—if the transactions were 
not loans (as Schering-Plough claimed they were not)—that it 
should be taxed ratably over the life of the Transactions.  This 
was desirable from Schering-Plough’s perspective because, as 
discussed above, a taxpayer generally wishes to delay the 
recognition of income as long as possible.   
 
Schering-Plough and Scherico did not generate formal 
loan documentation concerning the transfer of the “receive 
leg.”  However, intercompany loans at Schering-Plough 
generally lacked such documentation.  Also, despite a policy 
requiring that the Board of Directors pre-approve any 
investment having a maturity of more than one year, 
Schering-Plough did not seek approval for the Transactions 
before executing them, as a Schering-Plough witness 
conceded that it should have if it regarded them as sales rather 
than loans.   
 
Schering-Plough then reported each of the 
Transactions to the IRS as a sale, in purported accordance 
with Notice 89-21.  More precisely, beginning in 1996 (to 
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account for the sale of the first five years to an unrelated 
party), Schering-Plough began reporting a ratable portion of 
the lump sum paid by Scherico as income.  Schering-Plough 
did not, either in 1991 or 1992, report the transactions to the 
IRS on Form 5471, which is meant to disclose inter-company 
loans or sales involving foreign subsidiaries (in order to 
assure compliance with Subpart F). 
 
Ultimately, Schering-Plough repatriated approximately 
$690.4 million from its subsidiaries through the Transactions. 
B. Procedural history 
 
In 2004, after an audit, the IRS assessed Schering-
Plough deficiencies  of $472,870,042 for the tax years 1989, 
1991, and 1992, on the basis of its conclusion that the 
Transactions were loans, not sales, and thus immediately 
taxable under Subpart F.  Schering-Plough paid the assessed 
tax and filed suit in district court seeking a refund, arguing 
both that it had been treated differently from a similarly-
situated taxpayer and that the tax was assessed incorrectly 
because the Transactions were sales, not loans.  The District 
Court granted the government summary judgment on the 
disparate-treatment claim.  The District Court then held a 
bench trial at which it heard extensive testimony both from 
experts provided by both parties and from various individuals 
who had been involved in the design and execution of the 
Transactions.  After the trial, the District Court found in favor 
of the government on the tax-refund claim, as well.  The 
District Court held, in a thorough and thoughtful opinion, that 
the Transactions were, in substance though not in form, loans 
from the subsidiaries to Schering-Plough, or, in the 
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alternative, that the Transactions had no economic substance 
and should be disregarded for tax purposes.
10
   
 
Schering-Plough moved for a new trial, and the 
District Court denied the motion.  Schering-Plough now 
appeals the District Court’s holding on both claims. 
 
             II. 
Discussion 
 
 We begin by addressing the overarching theme of 
Schering-Plough’s arguments before us: that in reporting the 
funds it received from its subsidiaries in exchange for the 
“receive leg” of the ABN swap ratably over the life of the 
Transactions, it merely complied, as it was required to do, 
with Notice 89-21.  Therefore, it contends, to tax the 
Transactions as loans would be to ignore Notice 89-21 and 
disrupt Schering-Plough’s legitimate settled expectations as 
to their tax treatment.  However, Notice 89-21 explicitly 
stated that it did not address the tax treatment of “transactions 
[that] are in substance properly characterized as loans.”  If the 
Transactions were, in fact, loans, then Notice 89-21 simply 
did not bear on their tax treatment; instead, they should have 
been treated, like other loans with the same characteristics, as 
dictated by Subpart F—that is, as fully taxable.  Schering-
Plough certainly could not have had settled expectations to 
the contrary.  Therefore, whether we affirm the District Court 
turns simply on whether it accurately characterized the 
Transactions as loans, not on whether Schering-Plough 
                                              
10
 Because we uphold the District Court’s characterization of 
the Transactions as loans, we do not reach its alternative 
conclusion that the Transactions lacked economic substance. 
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complied with Notice 89-21, or what its expectations were in 
that regard.
11
 
 
A.  Substance over form 
 
A taxpayer challenging a tax assessment by the IRS as 
erroneous bears the burden of proof.  See, e.g., Univ. of 
Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 166 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2007).  We review the district court’s ultimate 
characterization of the Transactions de novo, and its findings 
of fact for clear error.  “The general characterization of a 
transaction for tax purposes is a question of law subject to 
review.  The particular facts from which the characterization 
is to be made are not so subject.”  Frank Lyon Co. v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 561, 581 n.16 (1978). 
 
The District Court’s decision rested on its finding that 
the Transactions were, in substance, loans rather than sales.  
The District Court held that, under the guise of a one-time 
payment to Schering-Plough to assume the receive leg of the 
ABN swap, Scherico actually lent those funds to its parent.  
Meanwhile, Schering-Plough paid Scherico back over a 
number of years by itself paying ABN on the “pay leg” of the 
swap, while ABN paid Scherico on the “receive leg” Scherico 
                                              
11
 Schering-Plough raises a further point, that it is difficult to 
know what transactions were covered by Notice 89-21 if the 
Transactions were not.  Of course, we are not here asked to 
and need not find that there were no transactions whatsoever 
that could have qualified for treatment as a sale under Notice 
89-21, merely that the transactions in question did not.   
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had been assigned.  In other words, Schering-Plough did not 
repay Scherico directly, but rather used ABN as a 
passthrough to disguise the nature of the transaction.  
Although ABN was paying sums to Scherico on the “receive 
leg” which would often differ from the sums it was receiving 
from Schering-Plough on the “pay leg,” ABN had another 
swap with Merrill Lynch that was intended to perfectly offset 
any  difference in the two.  ABN was even compensated for 
its participation in the scheme.  Therefore, the District Court 
concluded, the Transactions were nothing but disguised loans.  
It is this analysis of the Transactions that we review. 
 
The substance of a transaction, rather than its formal 
characterization, has always dictated its tax treatment.  “The 
Court has never regarded the simple expedient of drawing up 
papers as controlling for tax purposes when the objective 
economic realities are to the contrary.”  Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 
at 573 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  “To 
determine whether a given transaction constitutes a loan, the 
substance, rather than the form, of the transaction is 
controlling.”  Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 
494 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2007).  And, since “where the 
same persons occupy both sides of the bargaining table, the 
form of a transaction does not necessarily correspond to the 
intrinsic economic nature of the transaction,” transactions 
between related parties merit extra scrutiny.  Geftman v. 
Comm’r, 154 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).    
 
Therefore, we must carefully analyze the economic 
reality of the Transactions to determine whether it 
corresponds to their formal characterization as sales.  In 
particular, we have held that determining whether a 
 15 
 
transaction qualifies as a loan requires analysis both of the 
objective characteristics of the transaction and of the parties’ 
intentions. 
 For disbursements to constitute true loans there 
must have been, at the time the funds were 
transferred, an unconditional obligation on the 
part of the transferee to repay the money, and an 
unconditional intention on the part of the 
transferor to secure repayment.  In the absence 
of direct evidence of intent, the nature of the 
transaction may be inferred from its objective 
characteristics . . . . 
Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Schering-Plough challenges whether the District Court’s 
findings were sufficient evidence of its “direct intent.”  
Further, as Geftman does not make it clear whether the intent 
of the parties by itself is sufficient to create a loan, or whether 
that intent must also be reflected in the objective 
characteristics of the transaction in question, we analyze both 
questions.  Both, it transpires, support the conclusion that the 
Transactions were actually loans. 
 
1. Intentions of the parties 
 
With respect to the parties’ intentions, there is no 
reason to disturb the well-supported finding by the District 
Court that Schering-Plough, Scherico, ABN, and Merrill 
Lynch believed that they were crafting a loan, rather than a 
sale.  Schering-Plough’s director of financial reporting 
recorded in his notes that “[w]e are really accounting for the 
net deferred income as a loan, but tax could not have us 
record it as a loan.”  The same director created a loan 
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amortization schedule for the Transactions which referred to 
balances, “payment,” “interest,” and “principal reduction.”  
Schering-Plough has offered no convincing explanation for 
the use of such language outside the context of a loan.  A 
near-contemporary ABN credit proposal relating to the 
Transactions explained that Schering-Plough “through this 
mechanism receives a 20 year amortizing loan from 
subsidiary without incurring any negative tax implications in 
the U.S.”  Schering-Plough’s Board did not demand 
preapproval of the Transactions, which it was required to do 
for loans under its own policy, and its own treasury 
department described the transaction to the board as causing 
Scherico to “own[] financial assets which will earn interest,” 
which is consistent with a loan, not a stream of future 
payments.   
 
Further, there is meaningful indirect evidence that the 
parties knew they were creating a loan and thus seeking to 
evade taxation on the repatriated funds.  Notably, there is no 
explanation whatsoever as to why Schering-Plough directed 
Limited to funnel its payments through Scherico, whose 
earnings had already largely been taxed in the United States, 
rather than to pay Schering-Plough directly.  If Schering-
Plough genuinely believed the Transactions not to be loans, it 
had no need to take an additional step whose only plausible 
purpose was to disguise the fact that the source of the funds 
was Limited’s significant pool of earnings untaxed in the 
United States.  Further, Schering-Plough failed to report the 
Transactions on its Form 5471s for the relevant years.  If the 
Transactions were sales, Schering-Plough should have 
included them on their Form 5471s.  Their failure to do so is 
certainly suggestive of a desire to avoid scrutiny of the 
Transactions by the IRS.   
 17 
 
 
Schering-Plough’s attempts to downplay the 
significance of this evidence are unconvincing and at times 
disingenuous.  The District Court’s assessment of the 
intentions of the parties involved determinations of 
credibility, which “are ensconced firmly within the province 
of a trial court, afforded broad deference on appeal.”  
Neonatology Assoc. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 229 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  The District Court certainly did not commit clear 
error in making its findings.   
 
2. Objective economic attributes: intention or 
obligation to repay 
 
The more difficult question is whether the 
Transactions had the objective economic attributes of loans.  
As the United States’ experts established at trial, the 
Transactions had certain objective indicia of loans, such as a 
fixed maturity date, a fixed principal sum, periodic interest 
payments, and a payment schedule.  However, the main point 
of contention is whether, as our case law requires, the 
Transactions created “an unconditional obligation on the part 
of [Schering-Plough] to repay the money.”  Geftman, 154 
F.3d at 61.  Schering-Plough argues that ABN was obligated 
only to make payments to Scherico based on the floating 
interest rate that was the basis for the swap, and only for a 
limited time.
12
  Thus, ABN might never have paid the 
equivalent of the lump sum to Scherico.  That is, had the 
relevant interest rates dropped low enough, ABN’s payments 
to Scherico, based on those interest rates, would not have 
                                              
12
 We discuss the implications for the nature of the 
Transactions of third party ABN’s involvement below. 
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been sufficient to repay the funds provided to Schering-
Plough by Scherico.    
 
There is little case law establishing the contours of the 
“unconditional obligation” doctrine.  Indeed, even in 
Geftman, the court refers to the transferee’s intention to repay 
as if that were synonymous with its obligation.  Id. at 70 
(discussing “a bona fide loan with the requisite unconditional 
intention to repay” (emphasis added)).  The case that most 
directly addresses the role of “obligation” in creating a 
transaction which must be treated as a loan rather than a sale 
is Comtel Corp. v. Comm’r, 376 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1967).  In 
that case, the Second Circuit upheld the tax court’s treatment 
of a complicated series of real estate transactions as a 
“complex, prearranged financing plan” rather than a sale, 
even though “there was no legal obligation binding [the 
plaintiff] to exercise its option [to repurchase certain shares, 
and thereby repay the obligation].”  Id. at 794.  
“Realistically,” the court noted, “[the plaintiff] was compelled 
to” repay the sums in question, or else lose its other 
investments in the project.  Id.  The situation in Comtel is not 
identical to that here.  The District Court did not find that 
Schering-Plough was “compelled,” even in a practical sense, 
to repay the funds, as in Comtel.  However, Comtel does 
make it clear that a formal “legal obligation” is not an 
absolute prerequisite for a determination that a transaction is a 
loan.   
 
In the face of the tax code’s general insistence on the 
controlling effect of economic reality rather than form, it is 
more appropriate that, in determining whether there was an 
“obligation” to repay, the court look to whether the 
transferor’s intention was to structure the transaction to 
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ensure repayment of funds as a practical matter, rather than to 
whether there were literally no conditions on repayment.  It 
would be simplicity itself for two parties, especially related 
parties, to draft a contract in which repayment would not 
occur in the event of some occurrence so unlikely that both 
parties could be confident that it would never transpire, and 
thus repayment would occur despite the transfer being 
“conditional.”  It cannot be true that a party may convert a 
loan into a sale merely by including a provision establishing 
one condition precedent for repayment, no matter how 
unlikely that condition.  
 
Nonetheless, under many, perhaps most, 
circumstances, repayment might be sufficiently conditional to 
prevent characterization of a transaction as a loan.  In this 
case, however, the evidence shows that the Transactions were 
deliberately planned, as a practical matter, so as to ultimately 
provide Scherico with repayment of the funds transferred to 
Schering-Plough (plus interest).  “The determinative fact is 
the intention as it existed at the time of the transaction.”  
Geftman, 154 F.3d at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Schering-Plough has conceded that the interest rates in 
question needed to average only 2.93% for Scherico to be 
repaid, a figure beneath which they had not dropped since 
1962.  Indeed, the government contends that, even with the 
collapse of interest rates at the end of the 2000s, Schering-
Plough would have been repaid.  Further, as Schering-Plough 
had the right to repurchase the receive leg from Scherico (at 
least for the first Transaction), Schering-Plough could have 
arranged full repayment regardless of interest rates.  There is 
little better evidence for the “conditionality” involved at the 
time of the transaction than the parties’ own discussion of the 
Transactions as a means of ensuring repayment to Schering-
 20 
 
Plough.  Both Schering-Plough’s assistant treasurer and its 
expert testified at trial that Schering-Plough expected the 
subsidiaries to be able to recover their principal.
13
 
 
In another case where the court found a loan rather 
than a sale to have occurred, it noted: “We readily admit that 
the distinction is narrow between selling a property right to 
future income and assigning anticipated income as collateral 
to secure financing. Nevertheless, we feel that the distinction 
seems logically and practically to turn upon an out-and-out 
economically realistic transfer of a substantial property 
interest.”  Mapco Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110 
(Ct. Cl. 1977).  In this instance, the “asset” in which a 
property interest was transferred was precisely engineered to 
produce no net effect on the parties’ positions (except for the 
payment of precalculated interest).  If the Transactions had 
been designed so that there was serious uncertainty as to the 
return Scherico might receive, then one might argue that a 
substantial property interest had been, realistically, 
transferred.  Instead, it was as if no property had changed 
hands at all.
14
 
                                              
13
 Again, the District Court’s assessment of whether the 
subsidiaries could expect, as a practical matter, to be fully 
repaid under the terms of the Transaction involved its 
assessment of conflicting testimony, including that of experts, 
and is owed deference by this Court.  Schering-Plough does 
not establish, as it must, that this assessment was clear error.  
14
 It should also be noted that prepaid interest rate swaps in 
general do not involve a “legal obligation” to repay the 
prepaid sum, and for the same reason Schering-Plough raises 
here: the rates might fluctuate in such a manner that the 
payments might not equal the prepaid sum before the end of 
 21 
 
 
Thus, the evidence in this case is sufficient to show 
that, within the meaning of Geftman, the parties intended to 
secure a repayment to Scherico of the funds initially paid over 
to Schering-Plough that was, effectively if not explicitly, 
unconditional. 
   
3. Objective characteristics: third-party 
involvement 
 
Schering-Plough argues that the involvement of ABN 
means that the Transactions could not have been loans 
between Schering-Plough and its subsidiaries.  There is no 
reason, however, that a loan cannot be arranged among three 
parties.  Such was the case, for instance, in Mapco Inc. v. 
United States, 556 F.2d 1107 (Ct. Cl. 1977); see also United 
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  Schering-Plough does not seriously dispute this 
point. 
 
ABN might also, as the District Court found in the 
alternative, be properly considered as a mere conduit for 
payments between Schering-Plough and Scherico.  “In the 
conduit theory of the substance over form doctrine, the court 
may disregard an entity if it is a mere conduit for the real 
transaction at issue.”  Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 
553 F. Supp. 2d 716, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Comm’r v. 
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)).  “The contours of 
                                                                                                     
the life of the contract.  However, as discussed above, the IRS 
has treated such prepaid swaps as loans for a number of years, 
and Schering-Plough does not challenge that general 
characterization by the IRS. 
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the conduit theory are not well defined,” id., and we have not 
developed it extensively in this Circuit.  However, both 
parties in this case agree that Enbridge provides useful 
guidance.  In Enbridge, the court analyzed several factors:  
 (1) whether there was an agreement between the 
principals to do a transaction before the 
intermediary participated; (2) whether the 
intermediary was an independent actor; (3) 
whether the intermediary assumed any risk; (4) 
whether the intermediary was brought into the 
transaction at the behest of the taxpayer; and (5) 
whether there was a nontax-avoidance business 
purpose to the intermediary's participation.  
Id. at 730. 
 
In this case, the Enbridge factors favor a finding that 
ABN was a conduit.  The Transactions were structured by 
Merrill Lynch and Schering-Plough before ABN was brought 
in.  Although ABN is, in a legal sense, an “independent 
actor,” it has previously accommodated Merrill Lynch in 
other tax shelter arrangements, and there is little evidence that 
it had anything to gain from the swap itself, rather than from 
being paid for its presence in the Transactions.  See ASA 
Investerings Partnership v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).  And from Schering-Plough’s point of view as well, 
there appears to be no independent purpose to ABN’s 
participation.  That is, Schering-Plough might have borrowed 
the money from its subsidiaries; it might even have entered 
into a prepaid swap directly with the subsidiaries (selling 
them, for a sum up front, the right to receive a stream of 
future payments based on a particular interest rate).  Both of 
these approaches would have achieved the same end as the 
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Transactions themselves, making it appear that ABN was 
brought into the deal simply to mask the true nature of the 
Transactions. 
 
Schering-Plough objects that ABN cannot be a conduit 
because it incurred risks and costs of various kinds.  
Schering-Plough points to the holding in Frank Lyon that a 
company was not a conduit because it was “exposed . . . to [a] 
real and substantial risk” that “affected substantially” its 
“financial position.”  Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 577.  However, 
each risk or cost identified by Schering-Plough in this case 
ultimately appears to be insubstantial, illusory, or highly 
speculative.  Because ABN entered into a “mirror swap” with 
Merrill Lynch (that is, one which balanced out the swap with 
Schering-Plough, so that, to the extent ABN lost to Schering-
Plough, it would gain from Merrill Lynch), the transaction 
was designed to cost ABN nothing (and provide it a fee).  If 
Schering-Plough was forced to default on its contract with 
ABN, then ABN would, of course, be left with its 
independent obligation to pay Scherico, and thus would have 
lost money.  However, the government presented unrebutted 
evidence that the odds of such an occurrence were 0.0005%.
15
  
It is also true that, if the swap held with Schering-Plough 
went “into the red” and Merrill Lynch defaulted on its mirror 
swap, then ABN would be facing a risk of loss.  (Even then, 
ABN, as a creditor, might well be able to recover some or all 
                                              
15
 Due to the credit downgrade trigger in the contract, which 
would have permitted ABN to terminate the swap if Schering-
Plough’s credit rating dipped below a certain point for two 
months, the catastrophe leading to default would have had to 
have overtaken Schering-Plough in less than sixty days.  
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of its losses in bankruptcy.)  However, this risk, too, must be 
regarded as small. 
 
Schering-Plough also argues that ABN faced 
“opportunity cost” because the Basel Accords required a 
certain set-aside of capital as a result of the swap, and thus 
that capital was not available for use in other financing 
transactions.
16
  First, it should be noted that, since ABN 
received a fee for its participation in the Transactions, it was 
effectively compensated for the “tying up” of its capital.  
ABN may have projected that it could have received more 
compensation for the use of its capital than it actually did, but 
the court need not recognize its hopes that it could have done 
better than it did in the deal that it voluntarily entered into as 
a “cost.”  Finally, the District Court credited the testimony of 
the ABN negotiator of the deal that it did have the capacity to 
place the swap in what is known as a “special purpose 
vehicle,” which would have obviated the need for a capital 
set-aside; it simply failed to do so.
17
  Schering-Plough asserts 
                                              
16
 The Basel Accords, a set of international agreements, 
govern, among other things, the capital a company must set 
aside to provide for the risk of counterparties’ default on 
loans.  That is, they require that companies maintain a certain 
“cushion” against losses arising from credit defaults.  
Roughly speaking, the amount of capital is determined as a 
percentage of the amount of loans outstanding.  The larger the 
debt outstanding, then, the more capital a company must set 
aside. 
17
 A “special purpose vehicle” is a device used by 
corporations to create ostensibly independent entities that take 
on a particular liability and thereby obviate the necessity to 
include that debt on the corporate balance sheet.  If a debt is 
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the contrary, but does not offer any meaningful argument to 
overturn the District Court’s finding of fact on this point.  
Hence, any “cost” was the result of poor accounting, rather 
than the deal itself.       
 
Schering-Plough claims that, according to Enbridge, 
“a party is not a conduit if it incurs any risk at all.”  (App’t 
Br. 41)  However, this is not an accurate citation of the 
passage of Enbridge cited (which is quoted in full above).  
Enbridge merely considers whether the intermediary assumed 
“any risk” as one factor in a multifactor test.  In this instance, 
with most factors favoring a finding that ABN was a conduit, 
an extremely modest risk assumed by ABN should not 
outweigh them.  Therefore, the participation of ABN, a 
technically independent third party, in the Transactions by 
itself is not sufficient to prevent the characterization of the 
Transactions as loans. 
 
We therefore hold that the District Court correctly 
found that the Transactions were in substance loans, not sales. 
 
B. Disparate-treatment claims 
 
Schering-Plough also argues that it suffered disparate 
treatment at the hands of the IRS because another taxpayer 
(“Taxpayer One”18) engaged in a transaction substantially 
                                                                                                     
committed to an SPV, Basel does not currently require that a 
corporation set aside any capital to cover the risk of loss 
(since the liability, theoretically, no longer belongs to the 
company).   
18
 We continue the government’s sound practice of not 
identifying an individual non-party taxpayer by name and 
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similar to the Transactions and was not assessed a deficiency.  
In fact, when Taxpayer One was being audited in the mid-
1990s, the IRS National Office issued a Field Service Advice 
(a guide on applying tax law to a particular situation) to its 
personnel examining Taxpayer One indicating that 
transactions of this kind would not be taxable as loans.  
Schering-Plough asserts that the IRS should be bound by its 
treatment of Taxpayer One’s transaction.  The District Court 
rejected this argument.  Our review of its decision is de novo.  
Noel v. The Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 270 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
This claim, too, fails.  Schering-Plough argues that the 
IRS cannot treat similarly-situated taxpayers differently, 
relying primarily on International Business Machines Corp. 
v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965).  In IBM, one of 
IBM’s competitors obtained a private-letter ruling holding 
that certain of its products were not subject to a certain excise 
tax.  IBM immediately requested a similar ruling holding that 
its effectively identical products were not subject to the same 
tax.  After two years, the IRS denied the request.  At the same 
time, it informed the competitor that its products would be 
subject to the tax, but only prospectively.  Id. at 921.  In 
effect, therefore, only IBM was obliged to pay the excise tax 
for goods sold during the two years before the IRS’s denial, 
though both IBM and its competitor were obliged to pay the 
excise tax for goods sold after the IRS’s denial.  The Court of 
Claims ultimately concluded that this was an abuse of 
discretion.  Id.   
 
                                                                                                     
encourage appellant’s counsel to adopt this practice in the 
future. 
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Schering-Plough argues that IBM establishes that the 
IRS cannot issue one taxpayer written advice assuring it that a 
tax will not be assessed and then tax another under the same 
circumstances.  Unfortunately for Schering-Plough, although 
we have never construed IBM ourselves, other courts, using 
persuasive reasoning, have applied it very narrowly.  The 
Court of Federal Claims has “limit[ed] . . . . the holding of 
[IBM] to its facts.”  Amergen Energy Co., LLC ex rel. Exelon 
Generation Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 413, 417 n.6 
(Fed. Cl. 2010).  Other circuits have limited its application to 
cases where two taxpayers requested or received conflicting 
private letter rulings from the IRS.  Hostar Marine Transp. 
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 592 F.3d 202, 210 (1st Cir. 2010); 
Baker v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465, 1469 n.9 (11th Cir. 
1984) (“taxpayers who have not requested or received private 
letter rulings from the IRS will not succeed on a claim of 
discriminatory treatment because other taxpayers have 
received private letter rulings on the tax consequences of the 
same activities”).   
 
Although it may seem unfair to require one taxpayer to 
pay a tax when another similarly-situated taxpayer has been 
able to avoid it, there are sound reasons that such disparate 
treatment is not ordinarily considered a defense to tax 
liability.  “Despite the goal of consistency in treatment, the 
IRS is not prohibited from treating . . . taxpayers disparately.  
Rather than being a strict, definitive requirement, the 
principle of achieving parity in taxing similarly situated 
taxpayers is merely aspirational.”  Hostar, 592 F.3d at 210.  
The policy concerns implicated here are obvious.  A simple 
error by the IRS in applying the tax code should not 
effectively nullify that provision of the code for all other 
taxpayers, especially as it is not possible for the IRS to pursue 
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every taxpayer who errs in calculating his tax liability.  
Further, as the IRS is constantly confronted with attempts of 
ever-increasing sophistication and variety to evade the tax 
code, it must be permitted to pursue later tax evaders even if 
it initially fails to detect a scheme which permits evasion.
19
  
And if taxpayers could routinely challenge tax assessments by 
pointing to others who had not been compelled to pay under 
similar circumstances, the IRS would be swamped by 
collateral litigation of this kind rather than being able to focus 
on whether the taxpayer actually complied with the law—
which is, in the end, the taxpayer’s legal obligation. 
 
Although this case does not require us to determine the 
precise limits of IBM, we can say with assurance that it does 
not apply to Schering-Plough’s present situation.  In this 
instance, Taxpayer One did not receive a formal written 
ruling from the IRS holding that the Transactions were not 
taxable, as the competitor did in IBM and which other circuits 
have required to sustain a claim of disparate treatment.  
Although the IRS did issue a Field Service Advice respecting 
Taxpayer One, FSAs are not binding documents, nor, at the 
time, were they even public; they are meant as guidance for 
the team conducting an audit, not as an assurance for the 
taxpayer being audited.   
 
                                              
19
 The United States claims that this is what occurred with 
respect to Taxpayer One’s transaction.  Given the obvious 
complexity of the scheme originated by Merrill Lynch, this 
claim is entirely plausible.  The IRS should not be deterred 
from assessing deficiencies in this case simply because it had 
not fully grasped the potential for misuse of Notice 89-21 
when it was assessing Taxpayer One.  
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Perhaps more importantly, an FSA issued in 1997 and 
not intended for public consumption can hardly be said to 
have been the basis of reasonable reliance by Schering-
Plough in determining the tax treatment of the Transactions in 
the early 1990s.  In IBM, IBM was aware at once of the 
private-letter ruling in favor of its competitor and 
immediately applied for a similar letter, on an urgent basis.  It 
would appear that the Court of Claims felt that that, because 
IBM was selling effectively identical products, it could 
reasonably rely at once on the assumption that the IRS would 
eventually issue it such a ruling, as well.  However, since it 
was impossible for Schering-Plough to have seen the FSA 
concerning Taxpayer One’s situation before entering into the 
Transactions and choosing not to report the proceeds as 
receipts from loans under Subpart F, it had no such basis for 
confidence. 
 
Schering-Plough further complains that the IRS had 
inappropriate motives for pursuing its audits and requests 
discovery to explore this allegation further.  The language 
from IRS documents that Schering-Plough quotes indicates 
that at least one IRS agent thought that Schering-Plough’s 
approach to determining its tax liabilities was less than 
conscientious, given prior findings of evasion (which were 
upheld by this circuit, as the District Court noted, see 
Schering-Plough Corp., 651 F.Supp.2d at 226-27 & n.7).  The 
chutzpah of this argument is notable.  To the extent that the 
IRS pursued Schering-Plough more vigorously because 
Schering-Plough had a history of failing to comply with the 
tax laws, this represents commendable agency diligence in the 
light of past experience, not some kind of impermissible bias 
against Schering-Plough.  Schering-Plough offers no 
persuasive basis for us to order further discovery.  
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court=s grant of summary judgment in the United States’ 
favor. 
 
   
 
     
